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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
       s the concluding speaker at the conference on “Cyber War and Inter-
national Law,” co-sponsored by the Naval War College and the United 
States Cyber Command, Yoram Dinstein, Professor Emeritus at Tel Aviv 
University, professed some disappointment that there had not been a more 
extensive and sharper focus at the conference on “war.”1  But perhaps the 
limited amount of discussion of cyber “war” at the conference was a result 
of the reality that the international law issues arising from the possibility of 
war or armed conflict through cyber means have not been the primary 
concern of States and scholars faced with the challenges of the cyber 
threat. Rather, at least in the United Nations General Assembly and other 
international fora, such as the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), the threat posed by such adversaries of the United States as the Rus-
sian Federation and China seems to be an effort to adopt a global treaty 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Villanova School of Law. I want to acknowledge the excellent re-
search assistance of Lori Strickler, Reference Librarian, Villanova University School of 
Law; and Daria Hafner and Karrie Gurbacki, both second-year students at Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law.  
1. See Yoram Dinstein, Cyber War and International Law: Concluding Remarks at the 2012 
Naval War College International Law Conference, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 276 (2013).  
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that would arguably allow increased regulation by the United Nations—and 
perhaps the ITU—that would endanger the free flow of information on 
the Internet and such basic values as privacy and freedom of speech. To be 
sure, a hostile takeover of the Internet could have serious implications for 
U.S. vulnerability to cyber attack and thereby amount to a serious threat to 
its national security, but this is a far cry from possible revisions of the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello associated with cyber war, which is to the disadvantage 
of the United States.  
The title of this article poses the question whether, in the context of 
cyber war and other related forms of cyber attack, the international legal 
process itself may pose a threat to vital U.S. interests. Certainly, as we shall 
see below, a successful effort by the Russian Federation and China to con-
clude a widely adopted global treaty authorizing the United Nations or the 
ITU to regulate the Internet would constitute such a threat.  Moreover, in 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ry,2 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an advisory opinion stated 
that “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent 
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against anoth-
er State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are im-
putable to a foreign State.”3 
Similarly, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,4 the ICJ rejected 
Uganda’s claim that it had engaged in lawful military activity in Congo’s 
territory to protect itself against insurgents who had organized themselves 
there to commit armed attacks against Uganda’s territory. If the Court’s 
viewpoint is correct, this would have very serious implications for the right 
of self-defense against cyber attacks because many, perhaps most, of such 
attacks are committed by non-State actors. The problem is compounded by 
the often present difficulty in determining who or what actually engaged in 
the attack (the problem of attribution). Fortunately, for reasons considered 
later in this article, the Court’s viewpoint, which has been subject to wither-
ing criticism, is almost surely not correct. But the primary point to take 
away here is that one of the most important actors in the international legal 
process, the ICJ, has adopted a legal position that greatly threatens vital 
                                                                                                                      
2. Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).  
3. Id. ¶ 139.  
4. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19).  
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U.S. interests, as well as those of many other States in the international 
community.5    
 Speaking of vital U.S. interests, there have been recent developments 
in cyber space that raise the issue of U.S. interests in sharp relief. These 
developments involve four (apparently) State-sponsored computer viruses 
with the nicknames Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and Gauss. The goals behind the 
development of these viruses vary. Stuxnet, for example, first became pub-
lic knowledge in July 2010. It has been described as “far more complex 
than run-of-the mill hacker tools” and as  
 
a self-replicating worm that targeted programmable logic controllers 
(PLCs), the simple computers used to perform automated tasks in many 
industrial processes. PLCs are part of industrial control systems, most 
commonly referred to as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems. SCADA systems are critical to the modern industrial 
world, controlling such things as water plants, auto manufacturing, and 
electrical power grids.6 
 
According to the same commentator,  
 
[t]he Stuxnet code showed up on computer systems around the world, 
where it parked on hard drives, remaining inert if it did not find what it 
was seeking. The numbers indicate it was aimed at Iran; nearly 60 percent 
of reported Stuxnet infections occurred on systems in Iran. In fact, at 
least one system Stuxnet was programmed to target [were] controlled cen-
trifuges critical to the production of nuclear material. It appears that 
Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz was the specific target.”7 
  
In other words, the purpose behind Stuxnet was to undermine the Iranian 
nuclear program which, it is believed, is designed to produce a nuclear 
bomb. According to reports,8 a series of Stuxnet attacks temporarily took 
                                                                                                                      
5. For analysis and criticism of other decisions and advisory opinions of the ICJ that 
arguably undermine the vital interests of States, see JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING 
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
65–75 (2010).  
6. Gary D. Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack, JOINT FORCES 
QUARTERLY, Oct. 2011, at 70, available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/why-iran-didnt-
admit-stuxnet.html. 
7. Id.  
8. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, NEW 
YORK TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/ 
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out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to 
purify uranium. As to who was behind these Stuxnet attacks, although the 
evidence is not entirely conclusive, there are numerous indications it was 
the United States and Israel.9  
In contrast to Stuxnet, it appears the primary purpose behind the 
Doqu, Flame and Gauss viruses is cyber espionage. For example, a Wash-
ington Post article reported that the United States and Israel developed the 
Flame virus to gather intelligence “in preparation for cyber-sabotage aimed 
at slowing Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon.”10   
There is substantial support for the proposition that international law 
does not regulate espionage, although as is shown below, this proposition 
is controversial. There is also an issue whether, in any event, the same can 
be said of cyber espionage.  
This article begins with a discussion of the legality (or not) of Stuxnet 
and the other recently developed viruses under current international law, 
specifically the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, as well as an analysis of 
whether traditional forms of espionage or the emerging practice of cyber 
espionage are covered by current international law. It then turns to an ex-
amination of recent efforts by Russia, China and others to develop an in-
ternational law treaty for regulating the Internet, and efforts by Russia in 
particular to conclude a treaty on cyber war, and the extent to which these 
efforts may represent a use of the international legal process that threatens 
U.S. vital interests. Next the article explores some of the legal implications 
of the claim that the United States has conflated the terms “use of force” in 
Article 2(4) and “armed attack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter in such a 
way as to support an overly expansive interpretation of the right of self-
defense under Article 51. Lastly, the article considers some of the challeng-
es that the use of cyber warfare by terrorists may pose to international law 
and policy.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r= 0.  
9. Id.  
10. See Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller & Julie Tate, U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer 
Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say, WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-israel-developed-computer-
virus-to-slow-iranian-nuclear-efforts-officials-say/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story.html. 
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II. THE COMPATIBILITY OF STUXNET WITH CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE APPLICABILITY, IF ANY, OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO  
TRADITIONAL ESPIONAGE OR CYBER ESPIONAGE 
 
A. Stuxnet  
 
In various writings and various forums, Michael Schmitt has extensively 
explored the jus ad bellum aspects of cyber operations.11 He has also exten-
sively explored the jus in bello dimensions of cyber operations.12 With re-
spect to the jus ad bellum dimension of Stuxnet, the key issue is whether the 
Stuxnet virus directed against Iran’s centrifuges constitutes a “use of force” 
prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Schmitt poses the applicable 
test as follows: 
 
That the term “use of force” encompasses resort to armed force by a 
state, especially force levied by the military is self-evident. Armed force 
thus includes kinetic force—dropping bombs, firing artillery, and so 
forth. It would be no less absurd to suggest that cyber operations that 
generate consequences analogous to those caused by kinetic force lie be-
yond the prohibition’s reach, than to exclude other destructive non-
kinetic actions, such as biological or radiological warfare. Accordingly, 
cyber operations that directly result (or are likely to result) in physical 
harm to individuals or tangible objects equate to armed force, and are 
therefore uses of force. For instance, those targeting an air traffic control 
system or a water treatment facility clearly endanger individuals and prop-
erty.13  
 
To my knowledge, Stuxnet did not threaten or cause physical harm to indi-
viduals, but as noted previously, it did cause physical harm to 1,000 centri-
fuges critical to the production of nuclear material by Iran. This would 
                                                                                                                      
11. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 559 (2011). Another major article, which also explores the jus in 
bello dimensions of cyber operations, is Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and 
the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOUR-
NAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885 (1999).  
12. See Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo 
and Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies). See also Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 233 (2013).   
13. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, supra note 11, at 573.  
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seem to qualify as the kind of consequences to tangible property analogous 
to those caused by kinetic force suggested by Schmitt. 
To be sure, Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force applies by its 
terms only to “Members” of the United Nations.14 This raises the issue of 
attribution, i.e., unless the use of the Stuxnet virus can be attributed to a 
State there is no violation of Article 2(4). As indicated earlier in this article, 
however, there is considerable evidence that the United States and Israel 
were behind the Stuxnet attacks.15 For example, writing in the New York 
Times on June 1, 2010,16 David Sanger reports that during his first months 
in office, President Obama “secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated at-
tacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment 
facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of 
cyberweapons, according to participants in the program.”17 The expanded 
first U.S. sustained use of cyber weapons that Sanger refers to had begun in 
the George W. Bush administration and was code named Olympic Games. 
It remained secret until the summer of 2010 when a programing error al-
lowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the 
Internet. Computer security experts who began studying the virus gave it 
the nickname Stuxnet. According to Sanger, even after Stuxnet became 
public, President Obama decided to continue using it and after a few weeks 
of a series of attacks the result was that 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran 
had spinning to purify uranium were temporarily taken out of commis-
sion.18 
There is further evidence that the United States and Israel were behind 
the Stuxnet attacks.19 First, the use of zero-day hacks (a zero-day hack ex-
poses vulnerability in a piece of software that was previously unknown to 
the developer) demonstrates that this was likely the work of multiple pro-
grammers with a substantial budget. Indeed, some analysts have estimated 
that “it could have taken five to ten programmers upwards of six months 
                                                                                                                      
14. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides: “All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Unit-
ed Nations.”  
15. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.  
16. See Sanger, supra note 8.  
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
19. See Jeremy Richard, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for Modifica-
tions to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 842, 854 
(2012).  
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to create Stuxnet.”20 Moreover, Stuxnet is a “highly specialized piece of 
malware” and “the narrow range of circumstances in which Stuxnet would 
deploy its payload makes it unlikely that Stuxnet had another purpose be-
sides destroying nuclear centrifuges.”21 Additionally, the Israeli govern-
ment’s responses to news of the virus were highly suspicious. When Israeli 
officials were asked about their involvement in Stuxnet they “broke into 
wide smiles.”22 Also, a video played at the retirement party of former Israeli 
Defense Force Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi 
featured references to Stuxnet as one of the general’s operational successes, 
and, for its part, the United States has refused to deny involvement in 
Stuxnet.23  
Assuming arguendo that Stuxnet constitutes a use of force in violation 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,24 the issue then arises whether it also 
constitutes an armed attack that would give Iran a right to exercise self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.25 At the time of this writing, 
the U.S. government has not publicly articulated a general position on 
cyber attacks and Articles 2(4) and 51.26 There is some evidence that the 
United States has conflated the terms “use of force” under Article 2(4) and 
“armed attack” under Article 51, with the result that a cyber attack that 
constituted a use of force would also qualify as an armed attack, giving rise 
to a right of self-defense on the part of the State suffering the attack to en-
gage in a military use of armed force.27 But Michael Schmitt, along with 
                                                                                                                      
20. Id.  
21. Id.  
22. Id. at 856.  
23. Id.  
24. It is worth noting that in an email of August 14, 2012 to me, Michael Schmitt stat-
ed that in his opinion Stuxnet was a use of force under Article 2(4) (email on file with au-
thor).  
25. Article 51 of the UN Charter reads as follows:  
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and se-
curity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
   
26. See Matthew Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 
2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421, 431 (2011).  
27. For discussion, see id. at 431–37.  
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other commentators, rejects the idea that there is no difference between “a 
use of force” under Article 2(4) and an “armed attack” under Article 51. In 
Schmitt’s view: 
 
The key text in Article 51, and the foundational concept of the customary 
law right of self-defense, is “armed attack.” But for an armed attack, 
States enjoy no right to respond forcefully to a cyber operation directed 
against them, even if that operation amounts to an unlawful use of force. 
This dichotomy was intentional, for it comports with the general pre-
sumption permeating the Charter scheme against the use of force, espe-
cially unilateral action. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ acknowledged the 
existence of this gap between the notions of use of force and armed at-
tack when it recognized that there are “measures which do not constitute 
an armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force” and distin-
guished “the most grave forms of the use of force from other less grave 
forms.” Recall that the court specifically excluded the supply of weapons 
and logistical support to rebels from the ambit of armed attack, but noted 
that such actions might constitute uses of force. Simply put, all armed at-
tacks are uses of force, but not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks.28  
 
Not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks, but some do, and the is-
sue is whether Stuxnet qualifies as one of those that do. Schmitt has noted, 
correctly in my view, that “Article 51 restricts a state’s right of self-defense 
to situations involving armed attack, a narrower category of act than Article 
2(4)’s use of force.”29 Schmitt goes on to add: “Thus, faced with CNA 
[computer network attack ] that does not occur in conjunction with, or as a 
prelude to, conventional military force, a state may only respond with force 
in self-defense if the CNA constituted armed force . . . intended to directly 
cause physical destruction or injury.”30 Under this standard, there would 
seem to be little doubt that Stuxnet qualified as an armed attack under Ar-
ticle 51. It should be noted, however, that Yoram Dinstein has argued that 
to qualify as an “armed attack” a cyber attack must produce “violent con-
sequences.”31 In response to this argument, Matthew Waxman has suggest-
ed that  
                                                                                                                      
28. See Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, supra note 11, at 587.  
29. See Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra 
note 11, at 928.  
30. Id. at 929.  
31. See Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 103 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. 
O'Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (“The 
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[a] significant problem with this view is that in a world of heavy econom-
ic, political, military, and social dependence on information systems, the 
‘nonviolent’ harms of cyber-attacks could easily dwarf the ‘violent’ ones. 
Consider, for example, a take-down of banking systems, causing cascades 
of financial panic, or the disabling of a power grid system for an extended 
period of time, causing massive economic disruption and public health 
emergencies.32 
 
In his statement quoted above, Schmitt notes that the ICJ in the Nica-
ragua case supports the proposition that there is a gap between the notions 
of use of force and armed attack. It is important to note, however, that the 
U.S. government has emphatically rejected the Court’s analysis in Nicaragua, 
as well as a similar analysis in the later ICJ decision in the Oil Platforms 
case.33 Specifically, as to the Nicaragua decision, Abraham D. Sofaer, then-
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, in a luncheon address joint-
ly sponsored by the American Society of International Law and the Section 
of International Law and Practice,34 sharply criticized the ICJ’s comments 
on the right of self-defense, especially its narrow definition of the scope of 
the term “armed attack” to exclude “assistance to rebels in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistical or other support.”35 In Sofaer’s view, 
“[t]his ruling was without support in customary international law, or the 
practice of nations, which could not rationally be read to deprive a state of 
the right to defend itself against so serious a form of aggression.”36 Sofaer 
added that  
 
the ICJ’s ruling concerning the use of force creates artificial distinctions 
and mechanical rules that are fundamentally inconsistent with the princi-
pled but flexible approach followed by the United States since the Char-
ter’s adoption. Its restrictive approach in defining “armed attack” could 
deprive states of the right of self-defense against the most common and 
dangerous forms of aggression in the world today.37 
                                                                                                                      
crux of the matter is not the medium at hand . . . but the violent consequences of action 
taken.”).  
32. See Waxman, supra note 26, at 436.  
33. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).  
34. See Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, 82 AMERICAN SOCIE-
TY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 420 (1988).  
35. Id. at 425.  
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 426.  
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Writing in the Yale Journal of International Law in 2004,38 William H. Taft, 
IV, then-Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, was perhaps even 
more scathing in his criticism of the ICJ’s comments on self-defense under 
international law in the Oil Platforms case than was Sofaer with respect to 
the Court’s decision in Nicaragua. In Oil Platforms, Iran claimed that the 
United States had violated the “freedom of commerce” provision in the 
1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between 
the two countries by taking military action against Iranian offshore oil plat-
forms in 1987 and 1988. Interestingly, the ICJ rejected Iran’s claim, finding 
that the U.S. actions against the oil platforms did not disrupt commerce 
between the territories of Iran and the United States. In other words, the 
United States won the case. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to devote “a 
substantial portion of its opinion to a consideration of whether the U.S. 
actions against the oil platforms qualified as self-defense under internation-
al law. The Court’s statements concerning this issue were unnecessary to 
resolve the case and thus, in our domestic legal system, would be consid-
ered non-binding dicta.”39  
Parenthetically, I would suggest that Taft’s characterization of the ICJ’s 
statements as non-binding dicta was overly restrained. I would characterize 
the Court’s discussion of whether the U.S. action against the oil platforms 
qualified as self-defense under international law as an outrageous abuse of 
the judicial process. Having decided that Iran had no claim under the Trea-
ty of Amity with the United States, the Court had no legitimate reason to 
express its view on another argument the United States had made in re-
sponse to Iran’s claim. The Court was, after all, rendering a decision in a 
contentious case, not handing down an advisory opinion.40  
Be that as it may, Taft argued that the Court’s statements in the Oil 
Platform case concerning self-defense might be read as suggesting a number 
of limitations on the right of self-defense, namely: 
  
 that an attack involving the use of deadly force by a State’s regular 
armed forces on civilian or military targets is not an “armed attack” 
                                                                                                                      
38. William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 295 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
39. Id.  
40. In his article, Taft did note that five of the judges on the Court had expressly 
raised concerns about the majority’s decision to address the issue of self-defense. See id. at 
298. The five judges, all of whom wrote separate opinions, were Buergenthal, Higgins, 
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans and Owada.  
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triggering the right of self-defense, unless the attack reaches some 
unspecified level of gravity;  
 that an attack must have been carried out with the intention of harm-
ing a specific State before that State can respond in self-defense; that 
self-defense may be directed only against targets of the attacking State 
that have been the subject of specific prior complaints by the defend-
ing State; and  
 that measures taken in self-defense must be proportional to the par-
ticular attack immediately preceding the defensive measures rather 
than proportional to the overall threat being addressed.41 
 
Taft next stated categorically that “international law and practice do not 
support these limitations on the right of self-defense” and added, perhaps 
contrary to the fact, that “[t]he United States presumes that the Court did 
not intend to suggest these limitations.”42 
Interestingly, under either the Schmitt approach to armed attack,43 the 
U.S. practice of conflating Article 2(4) and Article 51 or the ICJ’s narrower 
definition of the scope of self-defense, there is a strong argument to be 
made that Stuxnet constituted both a use of force under Article 2(4) and an 
armed attack under Article 51. If so, it may seem odd that Iran’s reaction to 
this cyber attack was so restrained, almost to the point of not acknowledg-
ing its existence. Indeed, although Iranian officials initially stated that a de-
lay in its Bushehr nuclear power plant being operational was based on 
“technical reasons,” it did not complain of it being the result of a cyber at-
tack.44 Later, Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reported that mali-
cious software had damaged the centrifuge facilities, but did not suggest 
that Iran had been the victim of a State-sponsored cyber attack, much less 
that it had been the victim of an armed attack and therefore had the right 
to respond with armed force in the exercise of its right of self-defense un-
der Article 51.45 It is unclear why Iran’s reaction to the Stuxnet attack was 
so restrained,46 but one result of this restraint is that there has been rela-
                                                                                                                      
41. Id. at 299.  
42. Id. 
43. In his email to me of August 14, 2012, Michael Schmitt stated that it was his opin-
ion that Stuxnet was both a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and an 
armed attack under Article 51. See supra note 24.  
44. See Brown, supra note 6.  
45. Id.  
46. In his article Gary Brown speculates about a variety of possible reasons for Iran’s 
restraint. See id.  
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tively little reaction to Stuxnet in the world community and only a smatter-
ing of coverage in the media or legal literature.  
 
B. International Law and Traditional Espionage     
 
Several times during the “Cyber War and International Law” conference 
categorical comments were made that espionage is not prohibited by inter-
national law.47 If one is considering traditional espionage, it is important to 
distinguish between espionage in war or armed conflict and peacetime es-
pionage. Most scholarly writing on the relationship between espionage and 
international law concerns the law of war or armed conflict.48 John Radsen 
has suggested:  
 
The rules of espionage in times of war, whether based on the Hague Reg-
ulations of 1907, the Geneva Conventions, the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions, or other sources, are straightforward. A “scout,” 
someone who stays in military uniform or sufficiently designates himself 
as a combatant, risks being caught behind enemy lines. If caught, this per-
son should be dealt with as a prisoner of war because there is nothing 
treacherous or deceitful about his scouting or reconnaissance mission. 
But a spy, someone who does not wear a military uniform or a clear mili-
tary designation, is not entitled to protection as a prisoner of war. His de-
ceit can lead to severe punishment from the captors. Despite the poten-
tially harsh penalties, the trial itself for the charge of espionage should 
follow standard procedures. Note, by the way, that if the spy returns to 
his military organization after his mission and is then captured in battle 
wearing a Soldier’s uniform or designation, he cannot be punished for his 
prior act of spying. A spy therefore has a strong incentive to succeed in 
his spying mission and to return quickly to his military organization.49    
 
The situation concerning espionage and international law outside of the 
law of war is much less straightforward. Indeed, Radsen quotes with ap-
proval as having contemporary relevance, a 1962 statement by Richard 
Falk: “[t]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peace-
time practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether 
                                                                                                                      
47. See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 1, at 284.  
48. See John Radsen, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 595, 601 (2007).   
49. Id. at 602.  
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or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy and describes his 
hapless fate upon capture.”50   
Radsen goes on to report that the limited literature available on peace-
time espionage can be divided into three groups:  
 
One group suggests peacetime espionage is legal (or not illegal) under in-
ternational law. Another group suggests peacetime espionage is illegal un-
der international law. A third group, straddled between the other two, 
maintains that peacetime espionage is neither legal nor illegal—perhaps, 
as Nietzsche would say, that it is beyond good and evil. In any event, the 
uncertainty in the literature supports my thesis that espionage is beyond 
international consensus.51  
 
Of the three groups discussed by Radsen, the one that seems most 
convincing to me is the third: the group holding that espionage is neither 
legal nor illegal. In his discussion of the literature in the third group, Rad-
sen quotes a writing by two former CIA officials, Daniel Silver, a former 
General Counsel, and Frederick Hitz, a former Inspector General.52 In 
their writing, Silver and Hitz state that “[t]here is something almost oxymo-
ronic about addressing the legality of espionage under international law.”53 
Referring to the “ambiguous state of espionage under international law,”54 
they conclude that espionage is neither clearly condoned nor condemned 
under international law. Radsen adds by way of comment that:  
 
The rules and the ethics are situational. Countries are much less tolerant 
when espionage is committed against them than when they are commit-
ting it against friends and foes. Whether espionage is legal or illegal under 
international law, they are realistic about the fact that countries, for rea-
sons of self-defense and for their own interests, are going to commit es-
pionage in other countries. According to Silver and Hitz, that may explain 
why no treaties or conventions specifically prohibit espionage.55  
 
                                                                                                                      
50. Id. The cite to Falk is Richard Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, at v, v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962).  
51. Radsen, supra note 48, at 602.  
52. Id. at 606. 
53. Daniel B. Silver (updated and revised by Frederick P. Hitz & J.E. Shreve Ariail), 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (John Norton 
Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).  
54. Id.  
55. Radsen, supra note 48, at 606.  
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C. Cyber Espionage and International Law    
 
Cyber espionage is a relatively new development that raises a basic ques-
tion: Does cyber espionage differ from traditional espionage simply as a 
matter of degree, or is it an entirely new phenomenon that arguably poses 
new challenges for international law and practice? In addressing this issue, 
it is helpful to consider the workings of the new computer viruses with the 
nicknames Flame and Gauss.  
The British Broadcasting Corporation first began reporting about the 
Flame virus in May 2012 after the Russian security firm Kaspersky Lab be-
gan investigating the matter.56 The ITU had asked Kaspersky Lab to look 
into reports in April that computers belonging to the Iranian Oil Ministry 
and the Iranian National Oil Company had been hit with malware that was 
stealing and deleting information from their systems.   
Flame is designed to monitor computer networks and send back intelli-
gence to its creators.57 It reportedly has the capacity to “activate computer 
microphones and cameras, log keyboard strokes, take screen shots, extract 
geolocation from images, and send and receive commands and data 
through Bluetooth wireless technology.”58 It also reportedly is more than 
twenty times larger than Stuxnet, and, most important, “whereas Stuxnet 
just had one purpose in life, Flame is a toolkit, so they can go after just 
about everything they can get their hands on.”59 Along the same lines, 
Kaspersky Lab’s chief malware expert Vitaly Kamluk has reportedly de-
scribed Flame as “basically an industrial vacuum cleaner for sensitive in-
formation.”60 
The virus appears to have a wide reach indeed, as more than six hun-
dred specific targets were hit, ranging from individuals, businesses and aca-
demic institutions to government systems. Iran’s National Computer 
Emergency Response Team posted a security alert stating that it believed 
Flame was responsible for “recent incidents of mass data loss” in the coun-
                                                                                                                      
56. Reuven Cohen, New Massive Cyber-Attack an “Industrial Vacuum Cleaner for Sensitive 
Information,” FORBES (May 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen 
/2012/05/28/new-massive-cyber-attack-an-industrial-vacuum-cleaner-for-sensitive-info 
rmation/. 
57. See Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 10.  
58. Id.  
59. David Lee, Flame: Massive Cyber-Attack Discovered, Researchers Say, BBC NEWS (May 
28, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18238326. 
60. Id.  
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try.61 Among the countries affected by the virus are Iran, Israel, Sudan, Syr-
ia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Further instances of infected ma-
chines were detected in the United States, as well as in the United King-
dom and parts of Europe. Researchers, however, pointed out this did not 
necessarily mean these countries were targets, as “use of proxy servers can 
distort location data.”62   
Although the basic purposes behind Stuxnet and Flame appear to differ, 
the two viruses are similar in a number of ways, including the “names of 
mutually exclusive objects, the algorithm used to decrypt strings, and the 
similar approaches to file naming”; moreover, parts of the code are identical, 
especially the part responsible for the virus’s distribution.63 Alexander 
Gostev, chief security expert of Kaspersky Lab, described these similarities 
between the two viruses as “very strong evidence that Stuxnet/Duqu and 
Flame cyber-weapons are connected.”64  
A recent Washington Post article directly attributed Flame to the United 
States and Israel, stating that they developed the virus to gather intelligence 
“in preparation for cyber-sabotage aimed at slowing Iran’s ability to develop 
a nuclear weapon.”65 Both American and Israel officials, however, have de-
nied the Washington Post’s claim, and the evidence is conflicting.66 
Kaspersky Lab recently discovered the fourth allegedly State-sponsored 
computer virus to surface in the Middle East in the past three years, appar-
ently aimed at computers in Lebanon.67  According to Kaspersky Lab, the 
virus appeared to have been written by the same programmers who created 
Flame and may be linked to Stuxnet. This latest virus, nicknamed Gauss af-
ter a name found on its code, has been detected on 2,500 computers, most 
of them in Lebanon. The firm said its purpose appeared to be to acquire 
                                                                                                                      
61. Id.  
62. Id. 
63. See Resource 207: Kaspersky Lab Research Proves that Stuxnet and Flame Developers are 
Connected, KASPERSKY LAB (June 11, 2012), http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news 
/virus/2012/Resource_207_Kaspersky_Lab_Research_Proves_that_Stuxnet_and_Flame
_Developers_are_Connected. 
64. Id.  
65. See Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 10. 
66. See Sanger, supra note 8 (U.S. officials denying Flame was part of Olympic 
Games); Hayley Tsukayama, Flame Cyberweapon Written Using Gamer Code, Report Says, 
WASHINGTON POST (May 31, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-
31/business /35456034_1_stuxnet-flame-virus-skywiper%20 (Israel’s denial of involve-
ment with Flame).  
67. See Nicole Perlroth, Computer Virus Is Aimed at Banks in Lebanon, Security Firm Says, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at A4.  
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“logins for email and instant messaging accounts, social networks and, no-
tably, accounts at certain banks—a function more typically found in mali-
cious programs used by profit-seeking cybercriminals.”68  
Lebanese experts reportedly said that an American cyber espionage 
campaign directed at Lebanon’s banking system was plausible, given U.S. 
concerns that the country’s banks are being used as a financial conduit for 
the Syrian government and for Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group and 
political party. Researchers at Kaspersky Lab stated they were confident 
that Gauss was the work of the same hands as Flame, because the viruses 
were written in the same language (known as C++) on the same platform 
and shared some code and features.69  
At a minimum, it is clear that computer viruses such as Flame and 
Gauss constitute a method of espionage whose efficiency greatly exceeds 
that of traditional espionage. If Flame, for example, truly is “basically an 
industrial vacuum cleaner for sensitive information,” it raises an unprece-
dented threat to the national security interests of targeted States. It has 
been argued that only Russia, China, Israel and the United States have the 
capability of engaging in such sophisticated espionage.70 And there appears 
little doubt that the United States has an extraordinary capacity to engage in 
such espionage. Richard Clarke, however, who served three presidents as a 
counterterrorism czar, has argued that, although the United States has de-
veloped the capability to conduct an offensive cyber war, it has virtually no 
defense against the cyber attacks he says are targeting it now, and those that 
will be in the future.71 
Clarke argues further that China in particular is engaged in cyber espio-
nage that greatly threatens U.S. national security and goes so far as to claim 
that “[e]very major company in the United States has already been pene-
trated by China.”72 As an example, Clarke argues that the manufacturer of 
the F-35, the U.S. next generation fighter bomber, has been penetrated and 
                                                                                                                      
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
70. See Stephen Dockerty, Virus Plunges Lebanon into Cyber War, THE DAILY STAR 
(Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Aug-11/184234-
virus-plunges-lebanon-into-cyber-war.ashx#axzz2GqgfT6Pm.  
71. This is the basic theme of RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR 
(2010). See also Ron Rosenbaum, Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack, 
SMITHSONIAN, Apr. 2012, at 12, available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-
archaeology/Richard-Clarke-on-Who-Was-Behind-the-Stuxnet-Attack.html (in which the 
author interviews Clarke).  
72. Id. at 17.  
 
 
 
International Legal Process: Threat to U.S. Interests? Vol. 89 
 
325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the F-35 details stolen. He also contends that our supply chain of chips, 
routers and hardware imported from China and other foreign suppliers 
may have been implanted with “logic bombs,” trapdoors and “Trojan 
Horses,” all ready to be activated on command. As a result, Clarke is re-
ported as saying:  
 
My greatest fear is that, rather than having a cyber-Pearl Harbor event, we 
will instead have this death of a thousand cuts. Where we lose our com-
petitiveness by having all of our research and development stolen by the 
Chinese and we never really see the single event that makes us do some-
thing about it.73  
 
Clarke’s concerns go way beyond the cost of lost intellectual property, 
and focus on the possible loss of military power. He envisions a confronta-
tion, like the one in 1996 when President Clinton rushed two carrier battle 
groups to the Taiwan Strait to warn China against an invasion of Taiwan. 
This time, he suggests,  
 
we might be forced to give up playing such a role for fear that our carrier 
group defenses could be blinded and paralyzed by Chinese cyberinterven-
tion. (He cites a recent war game published in an influential military strat-
egy journal called Orbis “How the U.S. Lost the Naval War of 2015”).74 
    
It is arguable that the use of cyber viruses with the efficiency of Flame 
or Gauss for espionage purposes constitutes a violation of current interna-
tional law. As indicated previously,75 Iran’s National Computer Emergency 
Response team posted a security alert stating that it believed that Flame 
was responsible for recent incidents of “mass data loss” in the country. If 
one views data as a form of property, indeed a very important form of 
property in the modern world, a mass loss of data could constitute an 
armed attack. Also, if Clarke’s allegation that China has penetrated by cyber 
means every major company in the United States, with the result that major 
military assets like advanced fighter jets and aircraft carriers have been 
compromised or even rendered dysfunctional is true, this raises the issue of 
the need for anticipatory self-defense against a great threat to U.S. national 
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security—“perhaps the most controversial question in relation to the right 
of self-defence.”76   
To be sure, Christopher Greenwood, a judge on the ICJ, has stated that 
claims that cyber attacks should be considered armed attacks should be 
“treated with considerable caution.”77 Judge Greenwood suggests: 
   
The planting of a virus or the use of other computer techniques to un-
dermine, for example, the computer systems regulating a State’s financial 
system or immigration controls is difficult to see as an armed attack. Alt-
hough the consequences of such conduct may be very serious, it seems 
closer to the concept of economic coercion. On the one hand, if such ac-
tion were used to produce results similar to those which could otherwise 
be achieved only by the use of armed force, for example, causing aircraft 
to crash or dams to open and flood areas of a State’s territory, then the 
argument that such action should be treated as a form of armed attack is 
more plausible.78  
 
Judge Greenwood’s words of “considerable caution” should be taken 
seriously. In his article, however, there is no discussion of the four ad-
vanced computer viruses, which arguably introduce new complexities to 
the multifaceted debate over the scope of the self-defense concept. Ideally, 
it should be possible to convene a global international conference to con-
sider whether the advent of cyber attacks has created a need for revision of 
the jus ad bellum or the jus in bello. But as I have tried to demonstrate in an-
other forum, it has proven very difficult in today’s environment for an in-
ternational conference to conclude a global treaty to resolve challenges in 
the most important areas of international relations.79 In the area of the law 
of armed conflict, there is considerable concern that any major treaty that 
would result from a global conference would undermine rather than im-
prove the current law.80   
                                                                                                                      
76. See Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 41 (2011), http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id= 
/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e401&recno=2&. 
77. Id. ¶ 14.  
78. Id.  
79. See MURPHY, supra note 5. The five topical areas covered are the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the law of armed conflict, arms control and disarmament, 
human rights and international environmental issues.   
80. See id. at 161–80. See also Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, International Humanitarian Law: 
Should It be Reaffirmed, Clarified or Developed?, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILI-
TARY OPERATIONS 287 (Richard B. Jacques ed., 2006) (Vol. 80, U.S. Naval War College 
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The validity of this concern is demonstrated by recent efforts in inter-
national forums to regulate the cyber field, including the possibility of 
cyber war. Indeed, as suggested in the introduction to this article, these ef-
forts arguably constitute a use of the international legal process in a way 
that threatens U.S. and other Western States’ vital interests. It is to this im-
portant issue that the next section of this article turns.  
 
III. EFFORTS TO USE THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS TO REGULATE 
CYBER ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CYBER WAR, IN A WAY THAT THREATENS 
U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN STATES’ VITAL INTERESTS 
 
As this article is being written, the Financial Times features a full page article 
on the UN World Conference on International Telecommunications, 
scheduled to be held in Dubai in December 2012 and sponsored by the 
ITU, a specialized agency of the United Nations.81 Although, technically, 
the conference is supposed to focus on international agreements governing 
telecommunications, some proposals are expected to stretch broadly into 
the controversial issue of governance of the Internet. According to the  
Financial Times: 
 
The battle is already being fought behind closed doors at the Internation-
al Telecommunications Union. . . . Western nations—such as the US and 
the EU—in particular do not want to give the ITU extra authority that 
could indirectly benefit authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, eastern 
Europe and Asia. They are accused of seeing an opportunity to enhance 
their ability to control the web and crack down on political dissidents.  
 
“If new governance rules had been set to tighten the control of the web a 
few years ago we would not have had an Arab spring,” says one senior 
EU diplomat. “The internet must be left free and untouched, the less we 
tinker with it the better.”82   
 
There can be little doubt about the validity of the senior EU diplomat’s 
observation that if new governance rules had been in place to tighten con-
trol of the web at the time of the Arab spring uprising in the Middle East, it 
                                                                                                                      
International Law Studies). For a comment on Lavoyer’s presentation, see John F. Mur-
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would never have taken place, or at a minimum would not have enjoyed 
the success it did. His observation also illustrates an example of a possible 
connection between efforts to gain control of the Internet and cyber war. 
It will be remembered that the Arab Spring led to initial violence in Egypt, 
a civil war in Libya that, with the aid of NATO air coverage, resulted in a 
regime change, and to the extreme violence in Syria. A major goal of Russia 
and China—the leaders in the effort to issue regulations that would put 
limits on use of the Internet—is to ensure that they will not be subject to 
uprisings like the Arab Spring that result in regime change. Their hard line 
against Western efforts in the UN Security Council to impose stringent 
economic sanctions or other forceful measures against the Assad govern-
ment in Syria in the name of the responsibility to protect illustrates how far 
they are opposed to the entire concept of forceful regime change.83 
Russia and China have been pressing their efforts to achieve interna-
tional regulation of the Internet for some time now. For example, by letter 
of September 12, 2011, Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, transmit-
ted an International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN 
Secretary-General.84 The United States and other countries’ responses to 
this proposal have been lukewarm at best, and the United States has been 
consistent in its resistance to proposals calling for control of the Internet 
passing to a UN agency.85 For example, Terry Kramer, the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the Dubai conference, has been reported as saying that  
 
[t]he US is concerned that proposals by some other governments could 
lead to greater regulatory burdens being placed on the international tele-
com sector, or perhaps even extended to the internet sector. The United 
States also believes that existing multi-stakeholder institutions, incorpo-
rating industry and civil society, have functioned effectively and will con-
tinue to ensure the health and growth of the internet and all its benefits.86 
 
                                                                                                                      
83. For discussion of the Arab spring and the responsibility to protect, see John F. 
Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A Sceptic’s View, 18 ILSA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 413 (2012).   
84. For text of the code, see Letter dated September 12, 2011 from the Permanent 
Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. DOC. A/66/359 (Sept. 14, 
2011).  
85. See Leo Kelion, US Resists Control of Internet Passing to UN Agency, BBC NEWS 
TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:13 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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Similarly, according to a recently released document, “[t]he United States 
will oppose efforts to broaden the scope of the ITRs (International Tele-
communication Regulations) to empower any censorship of content or im-
pede the free flow of information and ideas.”87  
In sharp contrast, during a meeting in 2011 between then Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and ITU Secretary-General Dr. Hamadoun 
Touré, Putin reportedly told Touré that Russia was keen on the idea of “es-
tablishing international control over the Internet using the monitoring and 
supervisory capability of the International Telecommunications Union.”88  
It is hardly surprising that countries like China and Iran would support 
Putin’s proposal.89 But it is at least disappointing to learn that democratic 
countries like Brazil and India reportedly “share the belief that the Geneva-
based UN agency the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
would do a better job if put in charge of international cyber-security, data 
privacy, technical standards and the global web address system.”90  
In response to the Russian challenge, “at least within the U.S., con-
demnation of the ITU’s dangerously amateurish behavior has been univer-
sal. Republican and Democrats, Congress, the White House and the FCC 
[Federal Communications Commission], along with major industry repre-
sentatives, consumer advocates, and engineering groups including the high-
ly-respected and international Internet Society, have all raised alarms over 
both the content and the process of upcoming negotiations.”91 For its part, 
on April 19, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives received a draft reso-
lution whereby it was 
 
the sense of the House of Representatives that if a resolution calling for 
endorsement of the proposed international code of conduct for infor-
mation security or a resolution inconsistent with the principles above 
comes up for a vote in the United Nations General Assembly or other in-
ternational organization, the Permanent Representative of the United 
                                                                                                                      
87. See Larry Downes, Why is the UN Trying to Take over the Internet?, FORBES (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/08/09/why-the-un-is-trying-to-
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States to the United Nations or the United States representative to such 
other international organization should oppose such a resolution.92  
 
At this writing, the draft resolution has been referred to the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs but no further action has been taken on it.  
It remains to be seen what will happen in December at the conference 
in Dubai. One possibility is that the meeting could prove inconclusive. Alt-
hough each of the 193 countries expected to attend the meeting will have a 
vote, and the United States and like-minded countries could therefore be 
outvoted,  Dr. Toure’ reportedly has insisted that there will be no votes at 
the conference and no proposal will be passed without consensus.93 It may 
be impossible to reach consensus, however, on the controversial govern-
ance proposals, and if so, there is a good chance that action on them will 
be postponed at least for a year.94    
It remains to be considered whether it would be a good idea to try to 
reach an agreement on the terms of an arms control treaty on cyber weap-
ons. In its July 1, 2010 issue, the Economist noted that Russia had engaged in 
“longstanding calls for a treaty.”95  Surprisingly, the Economist also reported 
that General Keith Alexander, who heads U.S. Cyber Command, had wel-
comed the Russian initiative as a “starting point for international debate.”96 
The report is surprising because the United States has resisted Russian calls 
for an arms control treaty on cyber war,97 and there is no indication that 
U.S. policy on this subject has changed. 
There are several possible reasons for the U.S. resistance to Russian 
calls for a treaty on cyber war. For one thing, nation-States have differing 
views on what constitutes cyber-warfare. Most advanced democracies see 
cyber attacks as “an assault on the computer infrastructure that underlies 
power, telecommunications, transportation and financial systems.”98 Russia, 
however, prefers to call cyber warfare an “information war” and has intro-
duced a resolution in the United Nations every year since 1998 calling for a 
                                                                                                                      
92. H. R. Res. 628, 112th Cong. (2012).  
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treaty outlawing “information terrorism.”99 According to Russian Defense 
official Sergei Korotkov, “anytime a government promotes ideas on the 
Internet with the goal of subverting another country’s government—even 
in the name of democratic reform—it should qualify as ‘aggression.’”100   
In its article on “Cyberwar,” the Economist suggests that the United 
States has  
 
resisted weapons treaties for cyberspace for fear that they could lead to 
rigid global regulation of the internet, undermining the dominance of 
American internet companies, stifling innovation and restricting the 
openness that underpins the net. Perhaps America also fears that its own 
cyberwar effort has the most to lose if its well-regarded cyberspies and 
cyber-warriors are reined in.101 
 
At the same time, the Economist acknowledges another, perhaps more com-
pelling, reason for U.S. hesitation: “a START-style treaty may prove impos-
sible to negotiate. Nuclear warheads can be counted and missiles tracked. 
Cyber-weapons are more like biological agents; they can be made just about 
anywhere.”102 
As noted by Michael Schmitt in 1999, military thinkers devised and de-
veloped a term—information operations (IO)—anticipating this “new cat-
egory of warfare” that grows from the Internet’s interconnectivity and oth-
er new forms of communications.103 In the same year, the U.S. Department 
of Defense Office of General Counsel rejected calls for IO-specific rules as 
“premature”, arguing, inter alia, that in regulating IO via the law of war, the 
“process of extrapolation appears to be reasonably predictable.”104 Perhaps 
more surprisingly, in light of its generally favoring the development of new 
norms in the law of war, in 2003, the International Committee for the Red 
Cross expressed the view that “the existing legal framework is on the whole 
                                                                                                                      
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. See Cyberwar, supra note 95. 
102. Id.  
103. See Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra 
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adequate to deal with present day international armed conflicts.”105 Writing 
in 2007, Duncan Hollis stated that “[a] majority of military thinkers agree, 
arguing in favor of an analogy approach or decrying the possibility of IO-
specific rules as premature or unrealistic.”106 It appears that a majority of 
military thinkers and U.S. government officials are still opposed to the ne-
gotiation of a new international convention on cyber war.107 There is great-
er support for the negotiation of such a convention among civilian academ-
ic writers.108 In my view, the arguments in favor of this view have 
considerable cogency and might well carry the day if the circumstances of 
today’s world were more favorable to this possibility.109 But they are not. 
I have already noted the difficulty involved in trying to conclude a 
global treaty to resolve challenges in the most important areas of interna-
tional relations, including the law of armed conflict.110 The difficulties and 
the risks may be especially severe in the areas of maintenance of interna-
                                                                                                                      
105. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 4 (2003), 
available at 
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106. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need An International Law For Information Opera-
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Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice during the George W. Bush admin-
istration, and had “occasion to advise on cybersecurity issues” during his tenure, stated 
categorically that: 
 
In the face of this lack of clarity on key questions, some advocate for the negotiation 
of a new international convention on cyberwar—perhaps a kind of arms control agree-
ment for cyber weapons. I believe there is no foreseeable prospect that this will happen. 
Instead, the outlines of accepted norms and limitations in this area will develop through 
the practice of leading nations.  And the policy decisions made by the United States in re-
sponse to particular events will have great influence in shaping those international norms. 
I think that’s the way we should want it to work. 
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tional peace and security111 and the law of armed conflict.112 This is because 
the world has become increasingly hostile to the values and interests of 
Western democracies and nation-States increasingly prone to negotiate on a 
zero-sum basis.113 Russia and China, States that have progressively assumed 
leadership roles in this new environment, are dictatorships hostile to the 
United States in particular, and so-called emerging powers such as India, 
Brazil and Turkey are “not ready for prime time.”114 In such an environ-
ment, the negotiation of an international convention on cyber war would 
indeed seem “premature.”   
If it is “premature” to try to negotiate an international convention on 
cyber war, are there other steps that might be taken to mitigate some of the 
problems posed by cyber threats? It is worth noting that the Economist writ-
ing in 2010 noted the difficulties of negotiating “a START-style treaty”115 
and suggested instead that “countries should agree on more modest ac-
cords, or even just informal ‘rules of the road’ that would raise the political 
cost of cyber-attacks.”116  
The Economist’s reference to informal rules of the road raises the con-
troversial issue of so-called “soft law.”  The term “soft law” is controversial 
because various commentators, including this one, believe that use of the 
term creates confusion, especially because there is no agreement on what 
the term “soft law” means, and therefore is unhelpful.117 One definition of 
soft law would include non-binding guidelines or even rules of the road. In 
some instances, especially in the fields of human rights or international en-
vironmental law, such guidelines are a step toward the eventual conclusion 
of a binding treaty. But, as I have stated elsewhere, use of the term soft law 
is “especially unfortunate when, as is arguably increasingly the case, legally 
nonbinding international instruments are utilized not as part of the process 
of making international law but rather as an alternative to it . . . because of 
the perception that application of legally binding international norms 
would not be appropriate under the circumstances.”118 
                                                                                                                      
111. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 103–60. 
112. Id. at 161–80.  
113. See especially IAN BREMMER, EVERY NATION FOR ITSELF (2012). 
114. See Fareed Zakaria, A Post-American World in Progress: Why Emerging Powers Didn’t 
Lead in 2011 and Won’t in the Coming Year, TIME, Jan. 9, 2012, at 17.  
115. See Cyberwar, supra note 95.  
116. Id.  
117. For my views on this controversy, see MURPHY, supra note 5, at 20–23.  
118. Id. at 22–23.   
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In addition to recognizing the possibility of establishing “a set of non-
legally binding norms with the expectation that international legal rules will 
emerge from them in time,”119 Duncan Hollis has suggested that 
 
the path to creating international law need not always occupy the global 
stage. Perhaps the starting point for ILIO [international law for infor-
mation operations], like the law of war itself, might best lie in one or 
more individual nation-states producing a set of self-governing rules for 
their own IO. Or, a group of interested states might decide to articulate 
an ILIO among themselves, as the Council of Europe did for Cybercrime 
. . . .120 
 
However States may decide to approach the problems posed by cyber war, 
they will have to cope with the special challenges created by the increasing-
ly global operations of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. We turn to a consid-
eration of these challenges in the next section of this article.  
 
IV. TERRORISM AND CYBER WAR 
 
The literature on terrorism is vast, but there is no need discuss it in this 
article. Rather, for present purposes, the focus will be on what has been 
called the “new terrorism.”121  The quintessential example of a group en-
gaged in the new terrorism is Al Qaeda, and the quintessential example of a 
new terrorism act is the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001. With re-
spect to the old terrorism, the conventional wisdom suggested that terror-
ists had little interest in killing large numbers of people. The perception 
was that large scale killings would undermine their efforts to gain sympathy 
for their cause, which was usually to overthrow the government of a par-
ticular country (e.g., Germany or Italy). In sharp contrast, an especially dis-
quieting aspect of the new terrorism is the increased willingness of terror-
ists to kill large numbers of people. For example, the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001 killed 2,973 people; in Madrid on 
March 11, 2004, attacks killed 191 and wounded 2,050; and in the bomb-
ings in the Mumbai (Bombay) train system on July 11, 2006, they killed 209 
                                                                                                                      
119. See Hollis, supra note 106, at 1059.  
120. Id.  
121. See, e.g., John F, Murphy, Challenges of the “New Terrorism,” in ROUTLEDGE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 283–86 ( David Armstrong ed., 2009 ). 
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and injured more than 700.122  Jeffrey D. Simon has aptly pinpointed a ma-
jor cause of the radical change in attitude:  
 
Al Qaeda . . . is representative of the emergence of the religious-inspired 
terrorist groups that have become the predominate form of terrorism in 
recent years. One of the key differences between religious-inspired terror-
ists and politically motivated ones is that the religious-inspired terrorists 
have fewer constraints in their minds about killing large numbers of peo-
ple. All nonbelievers are viewed as the enemy, and the religious terrorists 
are less concerned than political terrorists about a possible backlash from 
their supporters if they kill large numbers of innocent people. The goal of 
the religious terrorist is transformation of all society to their religious be-
liefs, and they believe that killing infidels or nonbelievers will result in 
their being rewarded in the afterlife. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s goal was 
to drive U.S. and Western influences out of the Middle East and help 
bring to power radical Islamic regimes around the world. In February 
1998, bin Laden and allied groups under the name “World Islamic Front 
for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders” issued a fatwa, which is a 
Muslim religious order, stating that it was the religious duty of all Muslims 
to wage a war on U.S. citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the 
world.123   
 
Another facet of the new terrorism is the extraordinary extent to which 
terrorists have developed global networks. A recent study finds that Al 
Qaeda operates in a network that spans roughly one hundred countries, 
including the United States.124 While that network has weakened severely in 
recent years with the assassination or capture of key Al Qaeda leaders such 
as Osama bin Laden, the Al Qaeda organization has simultaneously gained 
many new militants to its cause through a “terror by franchise” approach.125 
That is, while the jihadi threat has been suppressed in some countries (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) it is increasing in places in North Africa and 
Lebanon. Groups inspired by Al Qaeda have in turn established links with 
a new breed of home-grown terrorist. The problem is especially acute in 
                                                                                                                      
122. See BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 615 (2d ed. 2010). 
123. Jeffrey D. Simon, The Global Terrorist Threat, 82 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 10, 11 
(2002). 
124. Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida), 
http://www.cfr. org/publication/9126/ (last updated June 6, 2012).  
125. See, e.g., Farhan Bokhari & Stephan Fidler, Rivalries Rife in Lair of Leaders, FINAN-
CIAL TIMES (London), July 5, 2007, at 5.  
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the United Kingdom, where radicalized British Muslims have established 
links with Al Qaeda and Taliban-sponsored training camps in Pakistan.126 
In continental Europe, home grown terrorists have established links with 
radical cells in North Africa.  
The concern that terrorists may resort to the use of weapons of mass 
destruction—nuclear, chemical, or biological—is long standing.127 Since 
September 11, however, this concern has been greatly heightened. Moreo-
ver, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda made plain on numerous occasions 
their desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear 
weapons, and their use of civilian aircraft on September 11 and their effec-
tive employment of the Internet since then have demonstrated their tech-
nological competence. Their proficiency with computers has led one com-
mentator to suggest that they now have the capacity for hijacking satellites: 
“Capturing signals beamed from outer space [it is alleged] terrorists could 
devastate the communications industry, shut down power grids, and para-
lyze the ability of developed countries to defend themselves.”128 
Interestingly, there appears currently to be a tendency to play down the 
risk of terrorists being engaged in a cyber war, on the ground that today’s 
cyber attacks are so sophisticated that they require a State government to 
carry out rather than individual terrorists or terrorist organizations operat-
ing on their own.129 This view may be too complacent, however.130 Certain-
                                                                                                                      
126. See Stephen Fidler, Radicalising Wave Crosses the Atlantic, FINANCIAL TIMES (Lon-
don), July 5, 2007, at 5.  
127. See Brian M. Jenkins & Alfred P. Rubin, New Vulnerabilities and the Acquisition of 
New Weapons by Nongovernmental Groups, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM 221 (Alone E. Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978).   
128. See Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web, NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 40, 50, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/08/02/040802fa_fact.  
129. See e.g., Richard, supra note 19, at 854 (where the author notes that the sophistica-
tion of the Stuxnet virus is so great that “it could have taken five to ten programmers up-
wards of six months to create Stuxnet” and therefore it is likely that a government or gov-
ernments is behind it rather than individual hackers). See also Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Meeting 
the Challenge of Cyberterrorism: Defining the Military Role in a Democracy, in COMPUTER NET-
WORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 353, 359 (arguing that the 
absence of any catastrophic events caused by IO demonstrates that IO may be more diffi-
cult to accomplish than theorists realize, but conceding that IO still poses a threat in cer-
tain contexts, such a IO’s capacity to steal identities).    
130. For example, during its 2006 armed conflict with Israel, Hezbollah, which the 
United States and Israel have labeled a terrorist organization, reportedly engaged in cyber 
war against Israel. According to the report,  
 
While fighting raged in the towns and hills of southern Lebanon, Hizbullah launched an 
all-out assault on Israeli civilian and military communications networks. Hizbullah hackers 
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ly the computer capability demonstrated by Al Qaeda is sufficient to allow 
it to be intensively involved in cyber espionage, and as to mounting a cyber 
attack that would result in a large number of deaths and major property 
damage, there is an increasing risk that State adversaries of the United 
States and other Western democracies might give the support to terrorist 
groups necessary to allow them to engage in such a cyber attack. For ex-
ample, Iran might give such support to Al Qaeda, and certain elements of 
the Pakistani government might do the same with the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. 
As is well known, a major challenge in defending against a cyber attack 
is the problem of attribution, i.e., determining where the attack came from 
and who or what engaged in it. The problem of attribution is greatly com-
pounded when a cyber attack is engaged in by a terrorist organization like 
Al Qaeda that is globally networked in over a hundred countries. In con-
sidering the feasibility of developing a customary ILIO, Hollis argues that  
 
attribution issues may make it difficult to ever discern state practice in IO. 
IO’s strength often lies in its anonymity and secrecy—victims of IO may 
not know that they have been subjected to it, let alone who is responsible 
(although constantly changing technology ensures that this will not always 
be the case).131  
 
Hollis also cautions that “it can take years or decades for state practice to 
coalesce into customary international law.”132 Moreover, it should be noted, 
dramatic changes in the nature of international relations have made the 
process of creating customary international law particularly problematic.133   
                                                                                                                      
shut down Israeli phone systems, electric grids, and IT systems periodically throughout 
the war. At the same time, they hacked into phone lines and eavesdropped on Israeli con-
versations, including those of Israeli soldiers, who, in many instances, gave away im-
portant tactical information on phone calls home. The hackers even cracked encrypted Is-
raeli military communications, providing the militants with information on Israeli 
movements and intentions. Through electronic warfare, Hizbullah made life even more 
difficult in northern Israel and, at the same time, gained valuable, tactical intelligence on 
its enemies. 
 
Andrew Chadwick, The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History, Part II, SMALL WARS 
JOURNAL 5 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-lebanon-war-
a-short-history-part-ii (citation omitted).  
131. See Hollis, supra note 106, at 1054.  
132. Id.  
133. For discussion and citations, see MURPHY, supra note 5, at 16–19.  
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It is at least arguable that the threats to States are no longer primarily 
from other States, but from non-State actors. If this is the case, Hollis asks, 
“do we serve international peace and security by imposing so many re-
strictions on how states use IO against non-state actors.”134 Answering his 
question in the negative, Hollis continues: 
  
For example, rather than seeing ILIO as essentially a question of restrict-
ing what States do to one another, ILIO could establish rules enabling 
states to better meet the challenges posed by non-state actors, particularly 
those bent on global terror. In the language of economists, ILIO may re-
duce the transaction costs that states face in combating transnational ter-
rorism. The current system—which might prohibit a state from respond-
ing to an al-Qaeda attack from Pakistan directly or immediately, requiring 
it instead to ask Pakistan for assistance—is not terribly efficient and may 
have high costs for the victim state’s safety and security. In its place, IL-
IO offers an opportunity for states to acknowledge their collective inter-
est in combating non-state terrorist actors as a threat to the state system 
itself, and to devise cooperative mechanisms that increase the efficiency 
of such efforts. This might involve, for example, states such as Pakistan 
consenting to suspend the non-intervention principle in certain pre-
agreed circumstances and allowing injured states to respond immediately 
and directly to IO generated from their territory (i.e., to conduct an active 
defense to CNA). Or, perhaps states could establish a program where a 
state sends information officers to other states who can approve IO 
methods that target or transit the sending state’s territory. There is already 
some precedent for this in the maritime context, through the practice of 
“shiprider” agreements, in which a foreign state agrees that one of its of-
ficials may serve abroad a U.S. ship and authorize it to conduct law en-
forcement activities against ships of that foreign state and even within the 
foreign state’s territorial seas.135 
 
Hollis’s remarks are intriguing. They posit, correctly in my view, that 
even adversarial States, for example, Russia and the United States, may 
have a common interest in agreeing upon rules, perhaps informal in nature, 
that allow them to cooperate in employing IO in combating global terror-
ism. The proposition that cooperation between Pakistan and the United 
States in combating IO by terrorists is possible may be a bit more prob-
lematic in light of evidence of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Direc-
torate assisting the Taliban in Afghanistan in their use of improvised explo-
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International Legal Process: Threat to U.S. Interests? Vol. 89 
 
339 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sive devices against members of the Afghanistan government and coalition 
forces.136 But even in this case, Pakistan might be more amenable to coop-
erating with the United States in using IO to response to Taliban or Al 
Qaeda attacks launched from Pakistan into Afghanistan than it has been 
with respect to drone attacks launched by the United States into Pakistan 
against the Taliban or Al Qaeda.  
In any event, at a minimum efforts to reach informal “rules of the 
road” regarding the use of IO against global terrorism would seem war-
ranted. There seems little doubt that the greatest national security threat 
facing the United States and its allies in the coming years is asymmetric 
warfare, of which cyber warfare is a prime example.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
To answer the question posed in the title of this article, i.e., whether the 
international legal process may constitute a threat to U.S. vital interests in 
the area of cyber war and international law, the answer is it may unless the 
United States and its allies resist efforts by Russia and other like-minded 
States to establish international regulation of the Internet that would bene-
fit authoritarian regimes and endanger basic values such as freedom of 
speech and privacy. Similar efforts by Russia in particular to conclude a 
treaty on cyber war that could undermine the United States and other 
Western States’ national security must also be resisted. At the same time, at 
least with respect to cyber war and international law, it may be desirable to 
engage in more modest steps, such as considering possible non-binding 
guidelines, either as a first step toward an eventual binding treaty or as a 
substitute for such a treaty.  
Although the conventional wisdom that holds that traditional espio-
nage is not regulated by international law, with the exception that persons 
prosecuted for espionage under national law are entitled to due process 
under international human rights law, the recent emergence of cyber espio-
nage utilizing extraordinarily effective computer viruses such as Flame and 
Gauss may require a rethinking of the conventional wisdom. Admittedly, 
reaching agreement on the rules of international law that would govern 
cyber espionage might be an impossible mission.  
                                                                                                                      
136. See John F. Murphy, Mission Impossible? International Law and the Changing Character 
of War, 41 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 4 (2011).  
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When all is said and done, it is highly likely that the legal issues sur-
rounding cyber war and related cyber activities are not the most important 
challenge facing the United States and its allies. If Richard Clarke is right 
that although the United States has developed a so far unmatched capacity 
to conduct an offensive cyber war, it has virtually no defense against the 
cyber attacks he says are targeting us now, and will be in the future;137 the 
greater urgency is to remedy this situation. A major obstacle to resolving 
this problem is the resistance of private industry to governmental efforts to 
induce businesses to improve their cyber security. It is clear, however, that 
government and private business cooperation will be indispensable if U.S. 
defenses against cyber attack are going to be effective. 
  
 
                                                                                                                      
137. See supra note 71 and associated text.  
